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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BUDDHIST LOGICIANS' VIEW ON
DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

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Introduction

The present paper is my humble attempt to give a clear idea about the Buddhist logicians' view on doctrine of momentariness. But in the limited scope of a paper, a detailed discussion of all Buddhist logicians' view on it is not possible. Hence, I have chosen to analyze critically the view-points of three famous Buddhist logicians Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti in this paper.

Buddhist philosophy occupies a unique place in Indian Philosophical system as a result of some novel perspectives of looking at things. It is a non-upaniṣadic philosophy. It does not believe in the substantive aspect of a thing; rather it is inclined to view things as consisting of only certain states and processes. As a result, Buddhist ontology is quite different from the ontology of Upaniṣadic philosophies i.e. philosophies which profess the reality of substances. There are four-fold basic conceptions in Buddhism, viz, Sarvamanityam, Sarvamanātman, Sarvam dukḥam and Nirvānam.

According to the doctrine of impermanence (anitya-vāda), nothing in the phenomenal world is permanent. Everything is impermanent. Body (rūpa), sensation (vedanā), perception (sañjñā), disposition (saṃskāra), consciousness (vijñāna) are all impermanent and are ultimately sources of suffering. Hence, everything in the world of mind and matter is changing, transitional in nature. Change is the rule of universe. Everything is subject to birth and death, to production and destruction. According to Buddhism, everything is dependently originated or everything owes its origin to dependence on conditions. And whatever is conditioned is subject to destruction. The poetic expression of the doctrine of impermanence is as follows:

"That which seems everlasting will perish, That which is high, will be laid low, Where meeting is parting will be, Where birth is death will come."

Analyzed philosophically the Buddhist position that 'everything is impermanent' means, 'there is neither being nor non-being but only becoming in the phenomenal world', which is similar to early Greek philosopher Heraclitus's 'theory of Becoming'.

The doctrine of impermanence is logically followed by the doctrine of momentariness. The doctrine of momentariness is the logically perfected form of the doctrine of impermanence. The doctrine of impermanence suggests that everything in the phenomenal world (saṃsāra) is susceptible

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to change. Nothing endures, nothing is permanent. However, it is envisaged that a thing exists for some time before being destroyed. But according to the doctrine of momentariness, a thing does not endure for more than one moment. It does not exist into two consecutive moments. It is destroyed in the next moment of its coming into being or existence. It is perhaps, Dharmakīrti, who, for the first time, logically presents the doctrine of momentariness in *Hetubindu. Śāntarākṣita* and Ratnakīrti later on improve upon the presentation of the doctrine in *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* respectively.

Dharmakīrti's View on Doctrine of Momentariness

Dharmakīrti maintains that everything in the phenomenal world is always changing. A thing comes into existence at one moment and goes out of it at the next. Nothing exists in two consecutive moments. The question is: how is it possible? Dharmakīrti's answer is: 'if a thing is really existent then it must have causal efficacy and consequently it must be momentary.'

In order to prove, 'what is existent, is causally efficacious and consequently momentary,' Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti adopt the 'reductio ad absurdum' method (*prasaṅgānumāna*). If it were proved syllogistically, then the argument would be like this, 'everything is momentary because it exists,' (*sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sattvāt*) The subject (*pakṣa*) in this inference, is 'all existent things' (*sarvaṃ*), the *probāndum* (*sādhya*) is 'momentary' (*kṣaṇikam*), the reason (*hetu*), is 'existence' (*sattā*). As a result, because everything is included in the *pakṣa*, it is not possible to show any instance as *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. In the absence of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* no *vyāpti* between *hetu* and *sādhya* can be formulated. Also, because the reason is found only in the *pakṣa*, it will be a reason existing only in the *pakṣa* (*pakṣamātra-vṛtti*). As a result, it will be a case of *anūposamhārī hetvābhāsa* of Nyāya logic.

Instead of going directly to prove that 'everything is momentary because it exists' Buddhist logicians take recourse to the indirect way of proving the doctrine by *prasaṅgānumāna*. They point out that there are absurdities involved in the opponent's opinion that things are causally efficacious, and are still non-momentary or enduring. In order to avoid the absurdities, they insist, it must be admitted that whatever exists, is causally efficacious and consequently momentary.

The demonstration of the absurdities is as follows: suppose a seed is an enduring thing and at the same time is causally efficacious, i.e. it produces the sprout. The question naturally arises how does it produce the sprout? Does the seed produce the sprout gradually or simultaneously?

Let us suppose that the seed produces the sprout gradually, i.e. it produces the sprout at the

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next moment of its coming into existence. In that case, the seed exists at moment₁ and it produces the sprout at the later moment (say moment₂). Hence, at moment₂ it is a producer (janaka) and at moment₁ it is a non-producer (ajanaka). In this case, the seed is characterized by two contradictory properties, viz, being a producer and being a non-producer at two different moments. The possession of these contradictory properties will act as an obstruction (vādhaka) in maintaining the identity of the thing.

Suppose, on the other hand, the seed produces the sprout simultaneously i.e. it produces the sprout at the same moment, (say moment₁), of its coming into existence. Then the question arises: what does it produce at the next moment (say moment₂). It cannot produce the sprout at moment₂. Nobody can do the same work that has already been done. Hence, the seed being the producer of the sprout at moment₁ cannot produce the same sprout at moment₂ and consequently, it becomes non-producer of the said sprout. It follows that it is characterized by two contradictory properties, viz, a producer and a non-producer at two different moments and the possession of such contradictory properties act as a hindrance (vādhaka) to its identity. Thus, for the sake of logical consistency, we have to admit that seed of moment₁ is quite different from the seed of moment₂ and consequently it is not an enduring thing but really momentary (kṣaṇikam).

Naiyāyikas however, do not agree that the statement, 'since the seed at moment₁, is a non-producer, and at moment₂ it is a producer, the seed of moment₁, is quite different from the seed of moment₂' is correct. They say that actually, the so-called seeds of moment₁ and moment₂ are the two stages of the same seed.

As a matter of fact, it is the same seed which, while existing in the granary, could not produce the sprout, but can produce the sprout while it is sown in the field and is conjoined with air, earth, water, sunshine etc. Hence, Buddhists have to admit that the seed of the granary and the seed of the field are not totally different. The seed of the granary is the previous stage of the seed of the field. Though the seed of granary could not produce the sprout, it had the potentiality to do so. The potentiality is actualized with the help of auxiliary conditions. But Buddhists point out that the seed in the granary has no potentiality to produce the sprout and it cannot be the producer of the sprout. The reason is: the productive power of a thing must be its intrinsic property. If the seed in the granary had such a power, then it could produce the sprout immediately. Nothing could stop it from producing its effect immediately². However, as a matter of fact, we see that the seed in the granary cannot produce the sprout. Thus, it is proved that the seed in the granary has no potentiality to produce the

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sprout.

If, in spite of all this, it is said that the seed in the granary has the potentiality to produce the sprout, then the questions are: why could it not produce the sprout while staying in the granary? Why did it have to depend on the so-called auxiliary conditions?³ If that seed were never able to produce the sprout by itself, if it were necessarily dependent on the so-called auxiliary conditions in order to produce then should we not say, in all fairness, that the seed necessarily lacked productive power? Should we not say that the so-called auxiliaries are producing the sprout? Why should we label the auxiliaries as mere helpers? Therefore, productivity can be ascribed only to such a thing, which is intrinsically capable of producing its effect and as such, produce it immediately without depending on anything else (*akṣepakriyā kāritva*). And because the seed of the granary cannot produce the sprout immediately, without depending on any condition, in order to be consistent, Naiyāyikas would have to admit that the seed in the granary is different from the seed in the field which actually produces the sprout.⁴

Buddhists point out that it may seem that the seed of the granary is the same as the seed of the field. But this is not the case. At the first moment the seed is in the granary and at the second moment the farmer takes it out of the granary. At the third, he places it in a pot. At the fourth moment, he sows it in the field. At the first moment, when the seed was in granary, it was not in contact with sunshine, water, air etc. At the next consecutive moments, it is conjoined with air, earth, water, sunshine etc. At the next consecutive moments, it is also conjoined with air, earth, water, sunshine etc. Ultimately the seed is related, with more and more causal factors, from moment to moment. When the process of changing does mature, the last moment of the seed series gives rise to the sprout.⁵

But Naiyāyikas may argue at this stage that, if Buddhists insist that the effect is the result of the conjoined action of a number of causal factors (which are treated by Naiyāyikas as main cause and its helpers) then the multiplicity of causes should really produce a plurality of effects. But as we actually see, the resulting effect is of one uniform nature. Does it not prove that the effect is produced by the main cause and its helpers?

In reply Dharmakīrti says that each causal factor plays separate role in producing the effect. Take the case of the production of an earthen pot. In the origination of the earthen pot, various causal factors like the clay, the potter and the thread are involved. In the case of the production of the earthen pot, the clay contributes to the character of earthiness of the pot, the potter is responsible for the contribution of a particular shape and the thread separates the pot from the wheel. Hence, it is

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clear that each causal factor is responsible for one specific function and contributes to one specific character of the pot. These various characters are directed towards producing the unitary effect. One must not, however, conclude that the multiple conditions produce separate and unrelated effects. The various characters of the pot jointly contribute to serve one particular purpose, viz, holding water. Because of their jointly serving one particular function, the various characters of the pot are conceived to be not unrelated.

Naiyāyikas may ask Buddhists the following questions at this stage. How can Buddhists believe in the multiplicity of co-operating causes and at the sametime, insist on their momentariness? Only Naiyāyikas can speak of the cause bringing about the effect with the co-operation of auxiliary causes, inasmuch as they believe in enduring causes. According to them, the seed in the granary did not produce the sprout. Yet, when the identical seed later comes to receive the co-operation of certain special auxiliaries, some changes occur in it i.e. it acquires an excellence (atīśaya) and by virtue of this, it produces the sprout. But in order to receive such an excellence the seed must be a continuant and not a momentary object.

Buddhists however, argue that the statement, 'co-operation is possible only when some excellence is produced in the main cause is not correct.' Even when a number of causal factors, viz, water, air, earth, sunshine etc. jointly gives rise to the sprout, then also we are entitled to say that these different causes co-operate among themselves. From this co-operation the sprout necessarily follows. The main cause need not acquire an excellence in order to be productive.

Naiyāyikas may again argue that if, from the co-operation of the so-called auxiliaries, 'excellence' does not gradually grow into the seed, then why does the seed not give rise to the sprout as soon as it is sown in the field?

Dharmakīrti's reply is: the fact that 'the cause does not attain any excellence' does not mean that a causal process is immune to any changes whatsoever. There are, in fact, some changes involved in the causal happenings. Yet this does not imply that the main cause, the seed, comes to acquire an excellence (atīśaya). This exposition needs some elaborations. At a particular movement the seed of the field is conjoined with fire, air, water, earth etc. and at the next moment, it is followed by new moment of water, earth etc. At the next moment these are yet again followed, by new moment of water, earth etc. The process of change goes on in this way. When the seed series, water series, earth series etc.⁶ receive a certain amount of change, their conflux is followed by the emergence of the sprout. This explains the necessity of a time gap between the sowing and the sprouting.

From the above discussion it can be concluded that the doctrine of momentariness is based on

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four fundamental principles: (i) The productive power of a thing is an intrinsic property of it. Without depending on anything else it produces its effect. (ii) There is no latent capacity in a thing. If a thing has any capacity, it will be actualized immediately (3) Causal efficacy is the criterion of reality. (iv) The identity of a thing is destroyed not only if it is characterized by two contradictory properties at *the same time* but it is also destroyed even if it is characterized by two contradictory properties at *two different times*.

Śāntarakṣita's View on Doctrine of Momentariness

After Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* advances another set of arguments seeking to reinforce the doctrine of momentariness. Śāntarakṣita's arguments are attempts to reinforce Dharmakīrti's formulation and to defend it. In this context, we shall analyze in detail Śāntarakṣita's formulation that 'destruction is independent of any extraneous cause (*ahetuka vināśa*)' which he, for the first time, introduces in a cogent form and uses it to establish the doctrine of momentariness on a firmer ground.

Śāntarakṣita's formulation of Spontaneous Destruction (*Ahetuka Vināśa*)

Śāntarakṣita says, if a thing is perishable in nature, then it does not depend on any external destructive cause. Since it is intrinsically perishable, it is destroyed immediately after securing its existence. He arranges the argument favoring momentariness in the following way.

If a thing is independent of others for any special feature, then that feature (intrinsic feature) always exists in it [For example, the proper assemblage of efficacious causes, that are independent of other causes, always gives rise to the effect.] Products are, independent of any other conditions for their destruction. Therefore, products are always liable to be destroyed.⁷ This is the affirmative formulation of the argument. The poetic expression of the spontaneous destruction is:

***'Janmile marite hobe, amar ke kotha kobe'* Bangobhumir proti- Mikel Madhusudan Dutta.**

That is, death is in its life, destruction is in its production. In order to strengthen the above argument Kamalaśīla, the famous commentator of *Tattvasaṃgraha* formulates the argument negatively in his *pañjikā*. The formulation, is as follows:

If a thing does not always contain a special feature in itself, then it is not independent of other conditions for containing that feature. (For example, unbaked pots which are not always brown are not independent of other conditions for possessing brownness.) Some objects are not (supposedly) always found to be destroyed. Therefore, these objects are not always independent of other conditions for being destroyed.⁸

Śāntarakṣita says that an objection may arise at this point. There are many examples where a thing is perishable by its very nature, yet for its destruction, it depends on other external destructive

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causes. For example, an earthen pot may be destroyable by nature, yet it is not destroyed unless it is struck by any hard thing like hammer etc. How can we then say that there is no need for any destructive agent?

Śāntarakṣita deals with the above objection by saying that if we say that a thing is destroyed by a destructive cause then the question arises: is the destruction of a thing, a positive entity (bhāva vastu) or a negative entity (abhāva vastu)? If it is a positive entity then the question arises: is the destruction of a thing identical with the cause of destruction or is it totally different from it?

If the destruction of a thing is a positive entity and is identical with the cause of destruction, then it is an accomplished event like its cause. In that case 'destruction which is already there, is to be caused by something' is a meaningless statement⁹. Hence, it is not acceptable.

If the destruction of a thing is totally different from the destructive cause, then the destructive cause has no role to play in the destruction of the thing destroyed. Otherwise, it will be a case of 'anything may be regarded as rendering some help to anything.'¹⁰

Śāntarakṣita also points out that if destruction is considered as a non-entity (abhāva), then it can never be caused by a destructive agent or cause, in as much as a cause brings about a positive entity and never a negative entity (non-existence) like square circle, sky lotus etc. Hence, extraneous cause of destruction becomes inefficacious. The destruction of things is immanent in the things themselves. Thus, things are destroyed immediately after securing their existence without depending on any external destructive cause. They are accordingly, momentary by nature.

Uddyotakara, the famous Naiyāyika raises an objection at this stage. If Buddhist logicians claim that the destruction is uncaused, then they will have to face a dilemma. Destruction as an uncaused thing, can either be a non-existence like a hare's horn or eternal thing like ether (ākāśa). If it is non-existent then all existent things will be eternal as they will know no destruction. Consequently, the

Buddhist doctrine of destruction of conditioned things will be groundless. If destruction is eternal, then it will co-exist with the thing destroyed. But it is absurd inasmuch as the presence and absence of a thing contradict one another. So, it is not admitted. If there is only destruction (absence), then there will be no production and consequently destruction will always reign in the world.

Śāntarakṣita replies that the above objection arises from the confusion between two meanings of the term destruction. (1) Destruction may mean the momentary existence of a thing. (2) Destruction may mean absolute cessation. Buddhists accept the first meaning of destruction. A thing's momentary character is due to its nature (svabhāva). It comes from its previous set of causal factors and is intrinsic to it. Hence, since the destruction (= momentary character of a thing) is the

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nature of a thing, the destruction does not depend on any external cause, it comes spontaneously.¹¹

Uddyotakara raises another objection against the doctrine of momentariness. He asks what is the meaning of the term *kṣaṇika* or momentary? It cannot be said that *kṣaṇa* stands for *kṣaya* or destruction and what possesses the destruction or *kṣaya* is *kṣaṇika*. If so then the question arises: how can the destroyed thing possess the *kṣaya* or destruction, inasmuch as at the time of destruction, it does not exist?¹²

Perhaps, the etymological meaning of the term *kṣaṇa* or moment is the smallest unit of time imaginable. And a thing is called momentary which exists only during that period. But Uddyotakara says that Buddhists cannot say this, as they admit time as an 'abstraction' and not as an additional entity over and above the so-called different segments of time called *kṣaṇas*.

Śāntarakṣita defends this position by arguing that a *kṣaṇa* (moment) refers to the particular character (*svabhāva*) of a thing which is destroyed immediately after its production.¹³ The poetic expression of the term momentary is: '*Phute ar tute palake' Ksanika of Rabindranath Tagore*. A thing which has this character is momentary or *kṣaṇika*. However, the difference between a character and the thing characterized does not correspond to any objective difference. Thus, the distinction between *kṣaṇa* (as a segment of time) and *kṣaṇika* (as an entity characterized by *kṣaṇa*) is imaginary. We make this distinction only in ordinary day to day parlance (TSP, V.I, p-179).

Jaiminī's objection and Śāntarakṣita's Answer

Jaiminī objects to the doctrine of momentariness from the point of view of recognition which, according to him, is a kind of perception. According to him, if everything is momentary, how do we recognize things like mountain, tree, diamond etc. that have been already seen on previous occasions?¹⁴ Buddhists may point out here that in the case of recognition the person recognizes wrongly taking similarity as identity. Hairs and nails keep on growing and changing every moment. The changed hairs, nails are similar in appearance to those existing earlier. As a result, we unreasonably think that hairs and nails appear the same as we have seen before.

Jaiminī argues that all cases of recognition are not like the wrong recognition of hairs and nails etc. as identical. There are various cases of recognition were depending on careful inspection of the materials, the recognizer pronounces them to be the same as that have already seen. As an example, he cites the recognition of mountain, diamond etc. These are the cases of valid recognition. In such cases the identity of recognized objects is not to be doubted. In cases of doubts regarding the identity of objects, the objects seem to be characterized by contradictory properties which militate against the unity of the object concerned. The object of a valid recognition, however, is not characterized by contradictory properties.

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But reacting to this objection, Śāntarakṣita firstly says that recognition is not a case of perception at all. The reason is: according to him, perception is free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous. But recognition is expressed in the judgmental form as ‘this is that Devadatta who was seen on that occasion before.’ The judgmental awareness of a thing is possible when we become definite that object. The definiteness or determination of a thing comes from conceptual cognition. However, a conceptual cognition is according to Buddhist logicians, basically erroneous.

Secondly, Śāntarakṣita proves that the object of recognition is not the same as the object of the first perception. If the objects of both were identical then the recognition would occur at the time of the first perception inasmuch as, if a cause is present in the perfect form, then the effect is found to appear immediately. The cause of recognition is its object. If we admit that the objects of both the first perception and recognition are the same, then it follows that the object of recognition was present at the time of the first perception and consequently recognition would have occurred at that time. But in fact, recognition did not occur at the time of the first perception. Hence, the objects of perception and recognition are not identical. In Śāntarakṣita's opinion recognition superimposes the identity on objects which are really different and consequently recognition cannot be defined as an unerring cognition.¹⁵

Because, recognition cannot be defined as an unerring cognition, it cannot be an accredited means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and consequently such a recognition which is not an accredited means of valid cognition, cannot be used to reject the doctrine of momentariness which is based on valid reasoning.¹⁶

The question may arise here that, if the objects of the first perception and recognition are not identical then why do we perceive them as identical? The answer is: though the objects of them are not totally identical, yet these are not totally different. Rather these are closely similar to each other. Apprehension of close similarity between them leads the apprehender to judge them to be identical. For example, when we look at a burning lamp for sometimes then it seems that the same flame continues to burn at different times. But if we properly reason then we have to admit that it is nothing but a number of different flames which are wrongly judged to be the same flame on account of the extreme similarity of their appearance.

Ratnakīrti's View on Doctrine Momentariness

Dharmakīrti first formulates the doctrine of momentariness positively in the form ‘whatever exists, is causally efficacious and consequently momentary’. But Naiyāyikas at the time of Dharmakīrti object to such an inference by saying that momentariness cannot be established as a

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probāndum (sādhyā) in the above way. In their opinion, causal efficacy is not invariably connected with existents. In fact, an existent entity may have the potentiality to produce the effect and yet not actually be engaged in producing, if the ‘helpers’ of the main cause are absent.

Confronted with such an objection, in order to defend and strengthen the doctrine of momentariness, Ratnakīrti gives a contrapositive version of that above positive formulation in the following way. That which cannot act successively or simultaneously, cannot bring about any effect and consequently is not real, for example, hare's horn, barren mother etc. The non-momentary (i.e. enduring) cannot act successively or simultaneously. Therefore, the non-momentary cannot bring about any effect and consequently it is not real.¹⁷

Ratnakīrti argues that the hypothesis of the enduring thing, being causally efficacious at successive moment, is unacceptable. Suppose an object exists at the first moment, and is causally efficacious. Being causally efficacious, it produces its effects not only of that particular moment but also those subsequent moments. But it is not acceptable. The reason is: a capacity to produce must be realized at once, not subsequent moments. And being impotent, at subsequent moments, it cannot be identical with the earlier potent thing. Again, the ‘hypothesis of an enduring object which produces all its effect simultaneously’ is not also acceptable. The reason is, having produced all its effects simultaneously a thing cannot produce its effects at subsequent moments. Nobody can kill the same bird that has already been killed. Hence, the barren nature of a thing existing at subsequent moments must be admitted to be different from its previous efficacious nature. Ratnakīrti concludes that a non-momentary (i.e. enduring) thing is ‘lacking in successive and simultaneous causal activity’. Consequently, it must be admitted to be unreal or non-existent.

However, Naiyāyikas point out that the reason (hetu) ‘lacking in simultaneous and successive activity’ is an unestablished reason. The locus of a reason must be a positive and existent fact. Otherwise, the reason will be an unestablished reason in the subject (pakṣa). The subject (pakṣa) cited above is ‘non-momentary’. And non-momentary according to Buddhists, is just a chimera (alīka). How can such a chimaera, which cannot be known by accredited means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) function as a subject of a reason? Ratnakīrti suggests that the reason employed in the inference is not unestablished in the subject (āśrayāsiddha). The reason (hetu) would be unestablished in the subject (pakṣa) if the subject ‘non-momentary’ had been completely uncognized. A completely uncognized entity can never be a figure in any inferential reasoning. And consequently, it cannot be the subject of an inference, on which any reason is predicated.

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However, Ratnakīrti argues, the 'non-momentary' is not a completely uncognised thing. It is cognized by the faculty of conceptual cognition (vikalpaja-jñana), though it is not cognized by any accredited means of valid cognition (e.g. perception or inference).

Naiyāyikas argue that what is not known by an accredited means of valid cognition, is an imaginary concept. If an imaginary concept can become the subject of an inference, then nothing will be treated as a fallacy of a reason unestablished in a subject (āśrayāsiddha hetu). The imaginary subject will be easily conceived in every case of inference.

Ratnakīrti, however, points out that such an apprehension is completely baseless. The fallacy due to a reason unestablished in the subject does occur when a real and positive reason is predicated on an unreal subject. The example is as follows:

That which has the property of being apprehended everywhere is omnipresent (vibhū). The soul has the property of being apprehended everywhere. Therefore, the soul is omnipresent.¹²

The soul according to Buddhists is an unreal myth, falsely constructed. If in such a subject, a real and positive reason (having the property of being apprehended everywhere) is predicated, then this will be a case of inferring with the help of a reason unestablished in the subject (āśrayāsiddha hetvā bhāsa).

Ratnakīrti concludes by saying that the fallacy does not occur when, (as in the Buddhist inference), an unreal, negative reason is predicated on an imaginary subject.

Notes and References

1. See *Systems of Buddhist Thought* of Y. Sogen. p.9.
2. tathā hy etad bījādyupanyase nirlothitam. tasmāt svabhāvasyānyathātvā sambhāvāt, taddharmaṇas tathābhāvo'ntyāvasthāvad anivāryaḥ. HB. p.55, See also HBT, p.119.
3. See HB, p. 45
4. See HB, pp. 45-47, & 53
5. See HBT, p. 116
6. The word 'series' here stands for the technical word, 'santāna' used by Buddhist logicians.

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7. ye yadbhāva pratyanapekṣāṣṭe tadbhāvaniyatāḥ, yathā samanantaraphalā sāmagrī svakāryotpādane niyatā. vināśaṃ pratyanapekṣāśca sarve janminah kṛtakā bhāvā iti svabhāvāhetuḥ. TSP.

8. ye tu punaryatra na niyatāḥ, te tatrānapekṣā api na bhavantyeva, yathā ghaṭādayo'pakvāḥ pākādiṣviti damatra vaidharmyeṇodāharaṇaṃ. Ibid. p.168.

9. na ca niṣpannasya kāraṇaṃ yuktaṃ. Ibid, p.169.

10. na hyanyasya kāraṇe'nyadupakṛtaṃ nāma, atiprasaṅgāt. Ibid.

11. kṣaṇasthitidharmā bhāva eva calo vinaśyatiṭi kṛtvā vināśāityākhyāyate. Ibid. p.173.

12. yadā hi kṣayo na tadā kṣayiti bhinnakālayorana matvarthīyo dṛṣṭaḥ. Ibid, p.179.

13. utpādanantaravināśasvabhāvo vastunaḥ kṣana ucyate. Ibid. 13

14. sa evāyamiti giritaruvajrādiṣvakṣavyāpārānantaraṃ pratyabhijñakhyam pratyakṣam pramāṇam bhāvānām kṣaṇabhaṅgaṃ nirākurvadudeti. Ibid. p.196.

15. Ibid. p.198.

16. tat kuto'smāt pratyabhijñānāt prakṛtibhrāntatvāt kṣaṇabhaṅganirākriyā sidhyet. Ibid. p.199.

17. yasya kramākramau navidyate na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam.

yathā śaśaviṣānsya. na vidyate cākṣaṇikasya
kramākramāviti vyapakānupalambhaḥ. *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. p. 83

18. yathātmano vibhūtvāsādhānārthamupanyastaṃ sarvatropalambhamānaguṇatvāditi sādhanam.

Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi. p.89

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